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Fiscal Policy, Public Spending and
the 2015 General Election
Politique budgétaire, dépenses publiques et les élections de 2015
Nicholas Sowels
The  general  election  in  May  2015  took  place  against  a  fair,  but  mixed  economic
background.  On  the  one  hand,  the  UK economy  was  experiencing  quite  strong  GDP
growth, running at a bit more than 2.5 percent on an annualised basis at the time of the
vote. This growth rate was similar to pre-crisis levels, and amongst the highest of the
industrialised nations.  It  certainly contrasted with the difficult  performance of  many
Eurozone countries. It also compared favourably with the years of “flat-lining” which the
British economy had experienced between 2010 as the Coalition government came to
office,  through to  about  the  middle  of  2013,  when growth finally  began to  pick  up.
Moreover, the growth performance was accompanied by falling unemployment and very
low inflation. Not for nothing did Chancellor George Osborne purr with pride and a bit of
French-bashing in his March 2015 Budget Speech, noting that he was not planning to
adopt “the French approach” advised by some.1
On the other hand, the UK economy was once again manifesting signs of its habitual
imbalances. These were most obviously linked to the fact that growth was associated with
house price rises, especially in the London area. Indeed, George Osborne had apparently
even congratulated himself in Cabinet on this in 2013, noting how he was engineering a
good old-fashioned house price boom in the run-up to the election.2 Significantly too,
household indebtedness continues to be relatively high. In the first quarter of 2015 it
stood at 145 percent of disposable household income.3 This was considerably lower than
the peak of 169 percent  in the first  quarter of  2008,  but  was still  high by historical
standards. Such borrowing, along with continued high public sector borrowing in turn
have had their counterpart in a yawning current account deficit, running at 5.5 percent
in 2014. Linked to these demand and supply imbalances, which are not particularly new
to the UK or even the English-speaking countries as a group, Britain has been suffering
from chronic productivity stagnation since the outset of the financial crisis and Great
Recession: labour output per hour has been flat for nearly a decade. Lastly, while the
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government deficit was indeed halved during the Parliament, dropping from 10% of GDP
in 2010 to around 5% at the time of the election, the budget squeeze was far from over
(see the table in the Annex for key economic indicators and government finance figures). 
The Coalition’s economic record going into the general election was therefore mixed, and
its  track  record  on  bringing  down  public  deficits  ambivalent,  given  its  original
commitment to more-or-less balancing the budget during the Parliament. As a result,
during the 2015 election campaign, the Conservatives pledged to press on with spending
cuts and to continuing implementing their plan. Their strong manifesto position may
have been an opening bid in possible renewed negotiations with the Liberal Democrats. In
the event, they obtained a small parliamentary majority, and immediately began applying
quite a strident policy of deficit reduction through spending cuts.
This  article  starts  by  examining  the  Coalition’s  record  on  fiscal  policy  and  public
spending. It is a controversial record, as we shall see in the first section, but it shaped the
background  to  the  election  and  to  the  policy  of  the  new Conservative  government.
Section 2 will  then outline the fiscal  policy proposals of  the main parties during the
campaign,  and  examine  in  particular  how  the  Conservatives’  negative  and  critical
electoral strategy vis-à-vis Labour seems to have been successful. The following section
will examine the pursuit of the Conservatives’ austerity agenda, notably as put forward in
the “emergency  budget”  of  July  2015.4 The article  concludes  by  putting forward some
considerations about how this policy is likely to evolve and what its results could be.
 
The Coalition government’s record on fiscal policy and
public spending
The Coalition government was formed after the election in May 2010 and immediately
announced that it would launch a programme of fiscal consolidation. This turned out to
be increasingly controversial as time went on. Yet as growth picked up in the second half
of 2013, it became the basis for the Conservative party’s electoral platform in 2015.
The  background  to  this  overall  strategy  of  fiscal  consolidation  was  the  massive
development of fiscal  deficits in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial  crisis and Great
Recession.  Globally,  it  is  estimated  that  the  financial  crisis  had  led  governments  to
commit $14 trillion into national banking systems and the international financial system,
equivalent to about a quarter of world GDP.5 Most of this money was not actually spent,
and  came  in  the  form  of  guarantees  of  bank  liabilities  which  often  went  unused.
Nevertheless substantial sums of public finance were also mobilised and directly injected
into banks’ capital. In the UK, the government committed £1.2 trillion to prevent the
banking system from collapsing.  This  sum involved £1,029 billion in  guarantees  (not
ultimately used) and £133 billion in direct outlays. Intervention was especially significant
in the UK as it was linked to the nationalisation of four major banking groups. As a result
of such increased spending (and the contraction of the economy at the end of 2008 and
into  2009),  total  government  spending  rose  to  nearly  50  percent  of  GDP,  while  tax
earnings fell. The overall impact was to push the annual public deficit into double figures.
When the Coalition came into office, the public sector deficit was therefore still running
at just over 10 percent of GDP.
Such was the background to the Coalition’s announcement that it would close the budget
gap by the end of the Parliament (in 2015). This policy of consolidation in the UK came at
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a time when European governments were on the whole shifting towards a policy of fiscal
austerity, and the economic policy debate was being influenced by warnings concerning
the growth consequences of high deficits. In particular, very influential empirical work by
two renowned US economists – Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff – suggested that
once  the  government  debt  to  GDP  ratio  rises  above  90  percent  it  has  the  effect  of
depressing median growth by 1 percentage point. Their study was based on examining a
large number of countries (44) and their debt and growth trajectories over a long period
of time (200 years). Its findings were thus based on statistical averages for many different
countries, political regimes and economic circumstances.6 Therefore, their observation is
far from being hard rule or law, universally applicable.  Nevertheless,  it  was a simple
finding which could be relatively easily understood and converted into public policy,
especially as many industrialised countries were experiencing debt levels at around 90
percent of GDP or more. Britain and other European countries in particular started to cut
spending,  with an insistence that has undoubtedly played a part  in slowing Europe’s
recovery from the Great Recession,  and so arguably compounding the European debt
crisis itself.
In  this  context,  the  Coalition  announced  in  its  “emergency”  Budget  in  June  2010  its
intention of bringing the budget deficit down from 10.1 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to 1.1
percent  by  2015/16.  In  its  Spending  Review presented  to  Parliament  in  October  2010,
detailed plans were set out to achieve this objective.  These plans included an overall
reduction in forecast spending of £81 billion, amounting to a 19 percent cut in spending
across all departments, except health and overseas aid. 
In the event, the change in policy from supporting growth to squeezing public deficits
arguably played an important role in holding down growth in Europe. The situation in
Greece has of course been the most acute and socially destructive example in which the
pursuit of fiscal austerity has weakened growth, making fiscal consolidation even more
difficult. To a far lesser extent, Britain too paid a price for the switch in policy, notably as
growth “flat-lined” for more than three years. This even led to a public clash between the
government and the IMF in April 2013, when the IMF’s Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard
warned the British government that it was “playing with fire”.7 Based on its own research,
the IMF and notably Mr Blanchard argued that the world economy following the Great
Recession was experiencing an exceptional situation. More specifically, he argued that
under the prevailing conditions of  low or non-existent growth and very low interest
rates, the multiplier of public spending could be significantly greater than 1: in other
words, a $1 cut in public spending leads to a fall in GDP that is greater than $1, and vice
versa for increases in spending.8 On the basis of this research, the Fund publicly warned
the UK government that its pursuit of spending cuts was endangering recovery. 
In the face of slow growth, the Coalition government in fact showed itself to be a bit more
pragmatic in reality than its rhetoric suggested. Significantly, while repeatedly stating
the importance of austerity, it accepted slower deficit reduction than originally planned.
But its public presentation of policy remained tough. Part of its approach was based on
political  calculation,  and  notably  the  idea  that  the  deepest  retrenchment  should  be
carried out as early as possible, so that a more lenient policy could be adopted in the run
up to the 2015 election. Part of the approach was also based on the collective memory of
the Conservatives concerning Mrs Thatcher’s defiance in the face of the economic slump
in the early 1980s – “the Lady is  not for turning” – and the insistence with which Mrs
Thatcher  and  Sir  Geoffrey  Howe  (Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  at  the  time),  pushed
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through an austerity budget in the trough of the economic downturn in 1981.  In his
speech  to  the  Conservative  party  conference  in  October  2012,  George  Osborne  very
specifically  referred to  the  resolve  of  this  first  Thatcher  government,  whose  actions
appear subsequently to have been justified. Similarly, with the upturn in growth during
the second half of 2013, the Coalition government and George Osborne in particular have
felt vindicated in their overall economic plan. In his Budget speech in March 2015, the
Chancellor clearly opened by saying, “We took difficult decisions in the teeth of opposition and
it worked – Britain is walking tall again”. He has also repeatedly noted that the UK has grown
“faster than any other major advanced economy in the world”.9 
Yet the recent record in growth and employment has surely also been underpinned to
quite some extent by unprecedentedly loose monetary policy. The Bank of England’s “
Bank rate” has been at 0.5 percent since March 2009. This is an exceptionally low rate
which the Bank has maintained for an exceptionally long period of time. In fact, it is
completely unprecedented in the Bank’s entire history stretching back to 1694! Until the
end of 2013, the low interest rate was furthermore accompanied by the unconventional
policy of “quantitative easing” (QE). This involved the Bank buying financial instruments
(largely government bonds) from banks and the markets, in an attempt to push down
long term interest  rates  and so  stimulate  economic  activity.  Generally  speaking,  the
impact of these policies is still hard to assess. Both low interest rates and QE are on the
whole believed to have helped in preventing the Great Recession from turning out much
worse, but they have not necessarily had quite the impact hoped for, and have likely
contributed to new areas of asset-price speculation, while also aggravating income and
wealth inequalities.  However,  for the Conservatives any doubts about macroeconomic
policy were not reflected in their election commitments in 2015 and in their subsequent
pursuit of strong public spending cuts after the election.
 
Fiscal policy and public spending in the 2015 general
election
The election results in 2015 came as a surprise. For months, the opinion polls had been
putting  the  Conservatives  and  Labour  neck-and-neck.  It  was  widely  expected  and
commented that there would be a hung parliament and some form of new coalition.
Various combinations of ruling parties were talked about, most notably some new form of
coalition between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats on the one hand, and
some form of coalition or agreement between Labour and the Scottish National Party on
the other hand. Other possibilities included a coalition between Labour and the Liberal
Democrats, and so on. It is possible that the election manifestos were drafted in view of
possible negotiations with potential coalition partners. This was said to be especially so
concerning the Conservative manifesto, which was perhaps more extreme than it might
have  been otherwise,  in  order  to  provide  room for  manoeuvre  for  the  Conservative
leadership in bargaining with potential coalition partners.10
Whatever the exact  calculations may have been,  it  is  sure that  the manifesto firmly
favoured the continuation of the policy of austerity. Indeed, the Conservative manifesto
very clearly stated the aim of reducing public deficits and then running surpluses as of
2018/19, in order to reduce public indebtedness. This turnaround in public finances was
to be achieved by departmental  savings of  £13 billion,  together with further cuts  in
welfare benefits totalling £12 billion. According to the manifesto, an additional £5 billion
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was to be saved by tackling tax evasion, bringing the total spending consolidation to £30
billion. Also, the manifesto set out the Conservatives’ objective of reducing administrative
expenditure by £1 for every £100 spent, during the first two years of office. Tellingly, it
notes that “[w]e don’t think there is a business that couldn’t do that”.11
The Conservatives pledged to achieve these fiscal adjustments – and the return to public
sector surpluses towards the end of the Parliament – through spending cuts, while ruling
our tax increases. The manifesto made a specific commitment not to raise VAT, National
Insurance Contributions or income tax. In fact, at the end of April 2015, David Cameron
even went so far as to commit a future Conservative government to pass a law prohibiting
tax increases in these areas. This was an unusual proposition in as much as it seeks to
bind future government  policy  discretion by formal  legislation.  As  even (Lord)  Nigel
Lawson  has  noted,  the  pledge  would  limit  George  Osborne’s  capacity  of  raising
government revenue in a way that no “previous Chancellor” would have done.12 
Fiscal responsibility also featured in the Labour party’s manifesto, entitled Britain can be
better. It is notable that in the preamble to the document itself, Labour committed itself to
establishing a “Budget  Responsibility  Lock”,  based on reducing the public  sector deficit
every  year,  and  achieving  a  budget  surplus  by  the  end  of  the  Parliament.  More
specifically,  the  manifesto  stated  that  the  Labour  party  had  no  new  spending  or
borrowing plans: “[a]ll of our commitments will be paid for by reducing spending elsewhere or by
raising extra revenue. For example, we will introduce a tax on properties worth over £2 million to
help raise the £2.5 billion a year for an NHS Time to Care Fund – part of our plan to save and
improve the health service”.13 
The  Labour  party  manifesto  also  proposed  making  richer  households  pay  more  in
taxation, while reducing their welfare benefits. Thus, it included a commitment to restore
the top income tax rate to 50 percent, for the top 1 percent of earners, with incomes of
more than £150,000. At the same time, the manifesto pledged to stop paying Winter Fuel
Payments to the top 5 percent of households, while capping child benefits. In fact, the
manifesto went so far as to commit the party to cap structural social security expenditure
in each spending review. The document also committed the party to using proceeds from
the privatisation of Lloyds bank and the RBS to pay back national debt.
The Labour party’s election pledges appear generally to have been quite detailed and
cautious.  This  reflects  the  legacy  of  New  Labour’s  and  Gordon  Brown’s  previous
commitments to “prudence”, and the generally mainstream approach to economics of Ed
Balls. Mr Balls was the principle economic policy advisor to Gordon Brown during the
opposition years in the 1990s and then during most of New Labour’s first two periods in
government (1997-2001 and 2001-2005). Subsequently, Ed Balls was shadow Chancellor
throughout Ed Miliband’s time as leader of the Opposition.  Labour’s broadly cautious
approach to  fiscal  policy  was  also  a  way  of  trying  to  present  itself  as  economically
responsible, especially given the poor support the party was getting from business.14
However, Labour failed to be as convincing as the Conservatives on the economy. Two
factors stand out in particular: first the hostility between Labour and business and second
Labour’s inability to be persuasive enough concerning government spending. The former
is not really within the scope of this article, but it should be noted that during its years in
opposition, Labour and Ed Miliband had made a number of pronouncements and policy
proposals that were interpreted as anti-business and regulatory. For example, at the 2011
party conference Mr Miliband had criticised “predators” who were “interested in the fast
buck”, etc. Similarly, proposals for “fixing broken markets”, freezing energy prices and so
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on  appear  to  have  been  clearly  interpreted  by  business  as  being  interventionist.15
Offsetting this was, however, Labour’s far more pragmatic position on European Union
membership. Prior to the election, the party had ruled out holding a referendum, and
during the campaign made a point of stressing that the Conservative commitment to a
referendum would plunge businesses into a long period of uncertainty before the vote,
and even afterwards in case of a vote to leave the EU.
Turning  to  public  spending,  the  Labour  Party  and  Ed  Miliband  personally  failed  to
counter Conservative criticisms of the previous Labour government and in particular the
policies of Gordon Brown in controlling public spending. Indeed, during the Coalition and
then the election campaign, the Conservatives managed to portray their successors as
having been reckless with public finances. Although government spending as a share of
GDP was not particularly high at the start of the financial crisis in (42.6 percent of GDP in
2006, see the Annex), the Conservatives skilfully obfuscated the fact that the explosion of
deficits and public sector debt in the closing years of the Labour government were largely
due to the financial crisis and hardly a direct result of old-Labour tax and spend policies.
A particularly damaging moment came in the closing days of the election campaign in the
live Question Time debate on the BBC, on Thursday the 30 April, a week before the poll.
During  the  programme,  David  Cameron,  Ed  Miliband  and  Nick  Clegg  were  each
questioned by an audience on all  areas of policy.  In the words of Guardian columnist
Jonathan Freedland:
...the  most  lethal  missile  of  the  night  came  from  the  man  who  asked  whether
Miliband would admit that the last Labour government had overspent. When the
Labour leader said no, a lowing sound could be heard, the noise of an audience
uniting in sceptical rejection of the man before them.16
For Labour grandee, Alan Johnson, writing the day after the 7 May election, this was a
turning point in the campaign when, “[t]he public became convinced that Labour had indeed
driven the car into the ditch and declined to return the keys”.17 
The  Liberal-Democrats’  manifesto  –  running  to  nearly  160  pages!  –  also  put  fiscal
responsibility right at the top of its agenda. The manifesto started by running on the
Party’s record as a coalition partner, and noting how the annual deficit had been halved
between 2010 and 2015. In contrast to the Conservatives, the Liberal-Democrats stressed
the importance of (some) tax rises to balance the books by 2017/18. They very clearly
positioned themselves as standing between the Conservative policy of relying only on
public spending cuts to bring down deficits, and Labour’s greater recourse to taxation to
close the budget gap. Notably, however, the manifesto did not indicate which taxes would
be raised (or created), and stated that “headline taxes” like income tax, VAT, National
Insurance and Corporation Tax should not be increased. The manifesto also pledged the
Lib-Dems to cut taxes for poorer households by raising the tax-free Personal Allowance
(i.e. the threshold below which individuals or households do not pay tax).18
Alongside  their  general  commitment  to  balance  the  books,  the  Liberal  Democrats
proposed two new rules by which fiscal policy and public finances were to be guided.
Their first rule was that once the budget deficit was closed in 2017/18, public sector debt
as a share of GDP should fall each year, except during recessions. The aim was for debt to
reach “sustainable  levels  around the  middle  of  the  next  decade”.  The second rule  was  to
balance public spending over the “economic cycle”, apart from finance for investment,
provided the debt rule is met: “the government will be able to borrow for capital spending that
enhances  economic  growth  or  financial  stability,  enabling  us  to  increase  this  productive
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investment”. This latter rule was very similar to New Labour’s Golden Rule for fiscal policy,
put forward in its 1997 manifesto, and then adopted when in government. This is not the
place to discuss the usefulness and feasibility of fiscal rules. Suffice it to say, however,
that the New Labour governments had already broken the Golden Rule to finance public
services  in  the mid-2000s,  prior  to  the  haemorrhaging of  public  finances  during the
financial crisis. Similarly, governments of the Eurozone, though they too have repeatedly
committed themselves to rules-based fiscal policy, have also repeatedly broken their own
rules. In short, announcing fiscal rules sounds fine in principle, but frequently turns out
to be more difficult to apply in practice over time, especially when circumstances change.
The case of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) manifesto is somewhat different. Unlike
the other manifestos, it specifically argued for supporting public services but in Scotland.
As the manifesto’s title – Stronger for Scotland – and the party’s exclusive representation in
Scotland both suggest, the SNP’s approach to the election was based overwhelmingly on
getting the best funding deal for Scotland. The manifesto said little about the whole of the
UK, although its preamble did argue that the Scottish Nationalists want “to help deliver
positive  change  for  the  benefit  of  ordinary  people,  not  just  in  Scotland,  but  across  the  UK”.
Accordingly, the manifesto preamble went on to declare that: 
We propose a real alternative to the pain of austerity, an end to unfair policies like
the Bedroom Tax, a higher minimum wage and protection for our NHS and vital
public services. Instead of even deeper Westminster spending cuts, we want to see
more investment in our economy, to create more and better paid jobs.19
The SNP manifesto did therefore contrast quite strongly with the manifestos of the three
main national parties presented above. It very clearly opposed “austerity”, and proposed
tackling deficit reduction not through spending cuts, but by raising taxes, including: “the
reintroduction of the 50 pence top tax rate, a tax on bankers' bonuses, a bank levy, a mansion tax, a
crackdown on tax avoidance, the abolition of 'non-dom' status and reversal of the married couple’s
tax  allowance”.  While  supporting  the  policy  of  debt  reduction,  the  SNP  manifesto
nevertheless argued that such tax increases would provide “£140 billion across the UK to
invest in skills and infrastructure, in our NHS and other public services, and in measures to protect
the vulnerable and lift people out of poverty”. In contrast to the other manifestos, the SNP
therefore argued far more forcefully for expanding welfare and public services, financed
through higher taxation.
Lastly, the UKIP manifesto was broadly based on a tax cutting and spending reduction
agenda,  in  that  order.  Accordingly,  its  key  proposals  included:  raising  the  personal
allowance to at least £13,000 during the forthcoming parliament; abolishing inheritance
tax – a “death tax” which “hits the middle classes hardest”; raising the 40 percent income tax
threshold, and introducing an intermediate 30 percent rate for “middle-income earners such
as school teachers and senior nurses” who should not be paying the top rate. The overall aim
of tax policies was to bring down income taxes as a whole, while making the tax structure
flatter. On the spending side, the UKIP manifesto begins by stressing that leaving the EU
would cut public spending by £9 billion (the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget). It
also proposed a significant cut in overseas aid, down from the international target of 0.7
percent of gross national income, to 0.2 percent (“matching the contribution made by the
USA”).  The  manifesto  went  on  to  put  forward  an  end  to  the  Barnett  Formula  for
calculating Scotland’s block grant from the UK’s national budget. According to UKIP, this
would  lead  to  “substantial  reductions  in  funding  for  Scotland”,  though  the  Scottish
parliament would be able to make its own decisions on taxation in Scotland. Finally, the
UKIP manifesto set out a number of areas for cutting direct government spending, such as
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reducing the size of the House of Commons, abolishing certain government departments,
abolishing unnecessary quangos, “ceasing all subsidies for bars and dining rooms in the Palace
of Westminster”, etc.20 In short, the tax and spending agenda of UKIP stood out as right-
wing, nationalist and quirky, in the image of Nigel Farage himself. 
 
Fiscal policy and government spending following the
Conservative election victory
To  widespread  surprise,  the  Conservatives  won  the  election,  with  a  small  outright
majority. With 36.9 percent of the vote (on a turnout of 66.1 percent), the Conservatives
took a total of 330 seats, giving them a working majority of 12 seats. 11.3 million electors
voted for  the  party.  This  contrasts  with the  last  Conservative  government  to  be  re-
elected, by a small margin of seats: in 1992, John Major led the Tories to victory, winning
a 21-seat majority, on the basis of 41.9 percent of votes cast, and an absolute historic
record number of votes totalling 14.1 million.
The  unexpected  success  by  the  Conservatives  in  2015  has  been  much  attributed  to
campaign strategy of Lynton Crosby, their Australian electoral consultant. This is not the
place to examine the strategy in detail,  but it is worth looking at a couple of related
issues. One has already been mentioned above, namely the success the Conservatives had
in labelling Labour as having been reckless with public spending when last in power. The
second involves the so-called technique of “wedge-politics” whereby one camp (in this case
the Conservatives) seeks to split its opponent’s traditional supporters. Thus, Mr Crosby
apparently – correctly – identified the rise of Scottish nationalism as a wedge to be used
against Labour, both in Scotland and England.21 By repeatedly stressing the economic
consequences and above all the impact on the Union of some form of alliance between
Labour and the SNP, the Conservatives skilfully divided and conquered their enemies.
During  the  closing  days  of  the  campaign,  Ed  Miliband  was  boxed  into  ruling  out
emphatically  any  possible  governing  agreement  with  the  SNP.  Along  with  his  poor
performance concerning the New Labour record (see above), this made it hard for the
Labour  party  to  appear  credible  in  terms  of  forming a  new (coalition)  government.
Putting it in more conventional terms, and reiterating his view that the Conservative
party dominates British electoral politics because of “fear”, Vernon Bogdanor commented
that  “[f]ear  of  Labour’s  economic  policies  and  of  an  SNP  stranglehold  at  Westminster  were
sufficient to see David Cameron comfortably home”.22
The unexpected nature of the Conservative victory in 2015 seems to have given David
Cameron’s  new  government  the  impression  of  having  received  a  strong  and  clear
mandate, to push through quite radical and often controversial measures. Most notably,
the  Conservatives  will  honour  their  electoral  pledge  to  hold  a  referendum  on  EU
membership by the end of 2017. This is a radical policy commitment that has been much
in the news since the election, and the Labour party has subsequently agreed to support
the  organisation  of  a  referendum.  More  contested,  however,  has  been  the  new
government’s decision to press ahead with the repeal of the Human Rights Act 1988, a
kind  of  sop  to  the  Eurosceptics  in  the  party.  The  Act  incorporates  the  European
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into British law, and even though the Convention is
not an emanation of the EU it seems to suffer from guilt by association. At the time of
writing (July 2015), the nature of reform in this area remains open, partly due to the fact
that senior Conservative politicians have openly defended the link to the ECHR, noting
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amongst other things that former Tory grandee and Lord Chancellor David Maxwell Fyfe
had played a key role in drafting the Convention in 1950.
The same cannot be said about public spending. If the Conservative manifesto was indeed
written as a kind of opening bid in view of possible negotiations with the Lib-Dems as a
renewed coalition partner, George Osborne has been quick to implement its promises of
spending cuts, including £12 billion in cuts to welfare. Indeed, a week after the election,
he announced in The Sun that he would put a second emergency budget to Parliament in
early July (2015), in order not to wait to tackle the problem of Britain’s budget deficits.23
Accordingly, on 8 July the Chancellor presented his second budget for the year to the
House of Commons. Ostensibly trailed as a budget for “working people”, George Osborne
set out the government’s vision of creating a “new settlement” based on “a plan for Britain
for the next 5 years to keep moving us from a low wage, high tax, high welfare economy; to the
higher wage, lower tax, lower welfare country we intend to create”. To this end, George Osborne
announced the introduction of a National Living Wage – drawing on the idea promoted by
the campaign of the Living Wage Foundation and the Labour party for a more decent
minimum wage –  and he stated that  it  would rise  to  £9  an hour  by 2020.  This  was
accompanied by an announced rise of personal allowances to £11,000 by 2016/7, and an
increase in the threshold for entering the 40 percent top income tax bracket to £43,000. 
In contrast and revealingly, Mr Osborne also pushed back the schedule for reaching a
budget surplus by one year, to 2019/20. This can be viewed as another manifestation of
his somewhat more pragmatic practice compared to his tougher policy statements.
At the same time, however, the Chancellor announced a series of measures to squeeze
welfare spending by £12 billion. Most notably, these include: a reduced cap on welfare
payments that any one household can obtain (down to £23,000 per year in London and
£20,000 in the rest of the country); and a significant change in the operation of tax credits
and other support for people in work. In particular,  the income levels at which such
credits are paid will be lowered, and the increase in credits is frozen. According to an
early estimate given by the Director of the Institute of Fiscal Studies,  the freezing of
credits will affect 13 million families, costing them an average of £260 per year; while the
drawing down of the allowance will lead to an average £1,000 fall in the incomes of 3
million families.24 
Apart from the specific measures put forward to cut welfare spending, George Osborne’s
presentation of welfare as such is very revealing. Paraphrasing an expression often used
by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Mr Osborne noted in his budget speech that “
Britain is home to 1% of the world’s population; generates 4% of the world’s income; and yet pays
out 7% of the world’s welfare spending”.25 Very significantly he went on to say that “It is not
fair to the taxpayers paying for it”. In making such a strong assertion, he has very clearly
reflected the success which neoliberals have had in arguing that “welfare” is a burden on
employed  taxpayers.  Initially  in  the  first  phases  of  neoliberalism  in  the  1980s,  this
strategy was based on the alleged inefficiencies of providing welfare benefits and services
to the middle class, rather than letting them take out various forms of private insurance.
26 Subsequently, once welfare is pared back to support a (poor) minority, it can then be
recast not as universal social insurance for all – Beveridge’s original vision – but as a
burden on the self-reliant who are in gainful employment. The emergency budget makes
this point unequivocally. 
To be sure, the July Budget also announced some measures to end so-called “non-dom”
status (i.e. the ability to claim non-residence status and hence tax exemption) for people
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living  permanently  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Similarly,  new  measures  and  enhanced
resources  to  collect  taxes  are  forecast  to  generate  £5  billion  in  revenue  through
reductions in tax avoidance. Yet the ideological orientation of the budget is not to be
mistaken. This is especially so given that Mr Osborne also announced that corporation tax
will be reduced to 18 percent by 2020, following the substantial reduction from 28 percent
to 20 percent which occurred in the last Parliament (2010-2015)!
In  short,  the  Budget  and  the  new government’s  overall  policy  approach  is  strongly
neoliberal and indeed neo-Thatcherite. It fits in with the government’s other policies, for
example the revival of tenants’ Right to buy their homes from housing associations as well
as from local councils, and the further tightening of legislation regulating strike action.
At the time of writing (July 2015), Mr Osborne and the government feel largely vindicated
in their overall economic strategy. Britain’s headline growth figures are good (second
quarter growth was 0.7 in 2015, up to the pre-crisis growth rate, with unemployment still
falling and inflation flat).  Whether the government’s economic policies are enough to




The election campaign was led by the Conservatives and the other major parties in the
expectation  that  the  electorate  would  once  more  return  a  hung  parliament  to
Westminster. It is therefore possible that the manifestos of the leading parties, whose
public spending commitments have been presented here, were to some extent drafted in
view of holding negotiations to form a new coalition government. They may be seen, to
some extent at  least,  as  constituting opening positions prior to coalition discussions.
Policies could then have been watered down during negotiations. It is important to note
from this point of view, that the three major parties (the Conservatives, Labour, and the
Lib-Dems) all  placed a high priority on bringing down public deficits,  though for the
Conservatives this is to be done through spending cuts.
In  the  event,  the  Conservatives  obtained  a  small  outright  majority  in  the  House  of
Commons, based on a relatively low share of the total electorate, and a relatively low
absolute popular vote. They nevertheless immediately set out to implement their agenda
in full, which in the case of public spending includes planned cuts in welfare spending
running to £12 billion. The stated aim is to close the existing deficit gap, which was still
over 5 percent of GDP in 2014, and generate a budget surplus by 2019/20.
The recovery in the British economy since the second half of 2013 is seen and presented
by the Conservatives as a clear indication that their strategy – their “plan” – is working.
While “austerity” may have contributed to the flat-lining between 2010 and early 2013, the
more  recent  pick-up  in  growth  has  confirmed  the  Conservatives’  view  that  the
contractionary consequences of squeezing public spending are not to be worried about, as
was already shown dramatically in the past by the 1981 budget squeeze which in fact took
place at a time when Britain was beginning to come out of its early-1980s slump. The bet
today is that Britain is in a broadly similar position. In fact, both the new government’s
fiscal policy (the squeeze on spending) and other policies like the revival of Right-to-Buy,
the  further  curtailment  of  trade union striking rights,  the  Eurosceptic  stance of  the
government  and  especially  the  upcoming  referendum  on  EU  membership  are  all
markedly neo-Thatcherite.
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But  2015 is  not  1979,  and neither  Britain nor  the rest  of  the industrialised world is
embarking on creating the neoliberal  paradigm. Quite the contrary,  more than three
decades of neoliberal  policies have left  the UK economy with a number of structural
imbalances,  including most notably the domination of international finance,  repeated
house-price booms and busts, deepening inequality (especially wealth inequality), ever-
retrenching manufacturing and low labour productivity. Both the Conservative election
manifesto and the policies implemented in the July 2015 Budget, as well as those likely to
follow in the autumn spending review are unlikely to tackle these structural weaknesses.
Thus while the UK economy is indeed benefitting from relatively strong growth at the
time of writing (July 2015), it may well be asked whether such growth is not in fact much
linked to the historically-unparalleled monetary boost it has received for more than five
years: interest rates have been much lower and for longer than at any previous time of
the Bank of England’s 320-year history. If the 1970s are often portrayed as the decade
when Keynesianism spun wholly out of control, it may today be asked whether the same
cannot be said for how cheap money is being used to stimulate growth. Also, unlike the
mid-1980s (or indeed the mid-1990s and mid-2000s) when the US economy was roaring
out of recession and other parts of the world economy were booming, today’s external
environment is considerably more fragile. Moreover, many of the underlying weaknesses
of the international  financial  system have not really been dealt  with.  This raises the
question of whether the rather simplistic and repeated policy mix being applied by the
new Conservative government is really sufficient to ensure a return to more balanced
growth, let alone to help generate a more equitable distribution of the fruits of growth.
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ABSTRACTS
The general elections in May 2015 took place against a fair, but mixed economic background.
After  three  years  in  the  previous  parliament  when  the  UK  economy  had  been  flat-lining
(mid-2010 to mid-2013), partly as a result of the Coalition’s policy of fiscal consolidation, the
pick-up in activity during the second half  of  2013 provided the outgoing government with a
reasonable  economic  record  to  present  to  the  electorate.  The  three  main  parties  –  the
Conservatives,  the  Liberal  Democrats  and  Labour  –  all  ran  manifestos  based  on  fiscal
responsibility, as in some ways did UKIP. Only the SNP proposed a clearer leftwing agenda based
on  stronger  public  services  and  higher  taxation.  Given  the  outcome  of  the  elections,  the
Conservatives appear to have had a more successful electoral strategy, in which they succeeded
in  portraying  themselves  as  economically  competent  while  characterising  Labour  as  having
wrecked the economy during the Blair-Brown years. Yet the economy was not the only major
issue to have shaped the electoral results. Since resuming office unexpectedly, the Conservatives
have pursued the policy of deficit and debt reduction begun under the Coalition, as part of a
tougher neo-Thatcherite approach. 
Les  élections  ont  eu  lieu  en  mai  2015  dans  un contexte  économique  relativement  favorable,
quoique mitigé. Pendant les trois premières années de la législature précédente (de mi-2010 à
mi-2013),  l’économie  britannique  marquait  le  pas,  partiellement  en  raison  de  la  politique
d’austérité budgétaire du gouvernement de Coalition. Puis, à partir du second semestre de 2013,
l’économie entre dans une nouvelle phase de croissance. Ainsi le gouvernement sortant pouvait
présenter  un  bilan  économique  raisonnable  à  l’électorat.  Les  trois  principaux  partis  –  les
conservateurs,  les  libéraux-démocrates  et  les  travaillistes  –  ont  tous  élaboré  des  manifestes
électoraux fondés sur la responsabilité budgétaire. Il en va de même pour UKIP. Seulement le SNP
a proposé une plateforme qui était clairement à gauche, comportant le renforcement des services
publics  et  une  imposition  plus  élevée.  Compte  tenu  des  résultats  des  élections,  la stratégie
électorale des conservateurs semble avoir réussi, notamment en soutenant que les travaillistes
avaient ruiné l’économie britannique pendant les années Blair-Brown. Pourtant, l'économie était
loin d'être la seule question qui a déterminé les résultats électoraux. Depuis leur réélection et
grâce à une majorité parlementaire inattendue, les conservateurs ont poursuivi la politique de
réduction des déficits et des dettes publiques commencée sous la coalition, mais d’une manière
bien plus dure et néo-thatchérienne. 
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